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alain Badiou’s writings on Beckett represent a surprising turn for his philosophy 
towards dealing with questions which he appears to ignore in the rest of his philosophi-
cal oeuvre. Here we see him taking up the issues of philosophical anthropology with its 
concern to designate the being of the human, and also to address the question of the 
nature of the being of that subjectivity that precedes the subject that is called forth by 
the Event. What this means, of course, is that Badiou’s treatment of Beckett bears com-
parison with the dominant tradition of interpretation of Beckett, namely existentialism. 
Badiou tends to dismiss existentialism as a species of nihilistic humanism, paralysed 
by its own vision of metaphysical absurdity, and generally wants to clearly distance his 
Beckett from what he takes to be the ideology of existentialism. 
Badiou’s reading of Beckett is structured around one very interesting and innova-
tive hypothesis, which is that while Beckett’s work The Trilogy, and its aftermath, Texts 
for Nothing, suggests that Beckett has been brought to an impasse, the works which come 
after, notably for Badiou How It Is and The Lost Ones, reveal a movement beyond this 
impasse. This movement beyond impasse in Beckett is analogous to Badiou’s notion of 
the unprecedented arrival of the Event because there is nothing that could account for 
it within the ontological situation of Beckett’s moribund avatars of the self. But what 
is perhaps most interesting from the point of view of Badiou’s philosophy is that the 
example of Beckett’s later fiction leads to a specific formulation of the Event in terms of 
the chance encounter with the Other. It is the Other who comes to relieve the self of 
the solipsistic hell of interminable monologue. a notable difference here from sartre for 
whom ‘Hell is others’. For Badiou’s reading of Beckett, we could perhaps say that ‘Hell 
is all alone’, but the retroactive light of truth, that is cast by the event of encounter with 
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the Other, is that existence is such that something can happen precisely in that situation 
where all hope of such a possibility appears exhausted. Thus the gift to being that comes 
from this unprecedented upsurge of alterity in the midst of the ontological aridity of the 
same is the insight into being’s contingency. 
starting with the extreme point Beckett arrives at with The Unnamable we confront 
a ‘fictional set-up’, as Badiou puts it, in which a cogito is engaged in a desperate or-
deal. This witness to the apparent aftermath of a catastrophe, or so ‘it’ tells itself, seems 
to have fallen into a pit of nothingness. This myth of its own fall is a key gambit in 
the attempt to establish the foundation for its proper place in being. The Unnamable’s 
problem arises from being limited to existing its place which, paradoxically, leads to the 
annihilation of any relation to a place. There is no sense of an elsewhere, not even a 
dim comprehension of an object in relation to which its place could be defined. This 
radically dispossessed cogito can only exist in the realm of its own inward determina-
tions provoked by inapprehensible and unthinkable objects which surround it, without 
the possibility of the cogito being able to know them. While the tedium of this cogito’s 
‘thinking of thinking’ gives the impression of being extinct, it is in fact a continuity in 
nothingness. Badiou correctly apprehends, from the perspective of his own philosophi-
cal intervention, that what at first appears as revelling in nihilism marked by impotence, 
ignorance and ambiguity is in fact an effort to endure the traversing of the void in order 
to wrest from this ordeal a penetrating glimpse into such fundamental questions as: how 
does a truth of being enter the fiction of its place? and: by means of which processes can 
a subject hope to identify itself? It is not literature’s role to provide the answers to such 
questions but rather to stage the situation of the emergence of their insistence and, as in 
the case of Beckett, by way of the figure of an ongoing failure, to reveal the impossible 
obligation of fidelity to the question. 
This fidelity to the questions, that are awakened by insight into the contingency of 
being, mark the singularity of Beckett’s artistic project. It is not the same fidelity as the 
fidelity to the truth that induces the Badiouian subject in the aftermath of an event. The 
Beckettian version of fidelity is a response to being that is marked by the openness to the 
possibility of an event prior to the actualization of any event. It is what Badiou names 
courage. For here there is something inexplicable arising from the situation of being, 
oscillating as it does between a blank staring at the grey-black of being and the intermi-
nable reiteration of prevailing meaning within the confines of solipsistic thought, there 
is the singularity of a being for whom an event is possible. It is this very being for whom 
an event is a possibility that Badiou names courage. It is important to elaborate here on 
just what has emerged out of Badiou’s engagement with Beckett. Courage names some-
thing that precedes any event and is therefore part of the ontological situation of being. 
Courage is a mark of ontological distinction rather than psychological disposition—it 
names the human mode of being that exists in relation to the situation of being and exists 
in such a way that the possibility of an event haunts the situation of being. Badiou’s nam-
ing of courage then posits an ontologically differentiated mode of being that recalls the 
sartrean being-for-itself as the being of ontological difference arising out of the heart of 
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Being-in-itself . By way of the upsurge of the for-itself, the sartrean ‘event’, Being-in-it-
self can be said to appear in situation and be haunted by the possibility of events. Badiou’s 
identification with sartre is often mentioned by Badiou’s commentators but always with 
a rapidity that betrays the embarrassment of current orthodoxy. It seems to us that the 
Beckett text suggests the need for certain points to be clarified at the ontological level 
of Badiou’s discourse for the connection to sartre to be fully illuminated. Clearly the 
anti-humanist rhetoric that satisfies itself with the contemptuous dismissal of a perceived 
variant of humanist ideology in the figure of sartrean existentialism is a distraction that 
must be put aside by serious thought that needs to engage with the philosophical issues 
raised at the ontological level by Badiou’s engagement with Beckett.
a further point of interest for Badiou’s philosophical enterprise arising out of his 
engagement with Beckett is the relationship between event, truth and the encounter 
with the Other. surprisingly, it seems that of the four Badiouian truth processes the one 
that corresponds the most to Beckett’s enterprise, particularly as it is deemed by Badiou 
to have opened out in Beckett’s later phase, is that of Love. Love as truth procedure is 
marked by the event of encounter with the Other. such encounter is the focus of Beck-
ett’s hypothetical experiments in How It Is and The Lost Ones but there is to be found nu-
merous traces of encounter, albeit failed, and meditations on love throughout Beckett’s 
oeuvre. What is singular about Love as a truth procedure is that it marks the possibility of 
shared truth—a possibility that can be said to supervene all other truth processes—for 
if truths exist it will be necessary, as Badiou says, ‘to expose these truths to the test of 
the Other’ (59). On the possibility of the sharing of singular truths our human happiness 
depends. 
To hear Badiou speak so frankly of courage and love with respect to the funda-
mental ethical orientation of Beckett’s project is remarkable. no doubt samuel Beckett 
would have smiled to hear it too.
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